foster shermans mississippi campaign

Foster: "Sherman's Mississippi Campaign"

[Sherman's Mississippi Campaign by Buckley Foster. (University of

Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 2006) Hardback, 10 maps, notes,

bibliography. pp. 232, ISBN 0-8173-1519-5] $29.95

In February 1864, William T. Sherman took two infantry corps on a

march from Vicksburg across the width of central Mississippi, ending

up at the important railroad junction at Meridian. At the same time, a

Union cavalry force under William Sooy Smith was to depart the Memphis

area and travel down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to meet Sherman in

Meridian. From there a decision would be made whether to continue on

into Alabama. Both wings were to forage liberally and destroy

everything of military value (with particular attention paid to the

rail transportation network).

An excellent, minutely detailed military study of the campaign has

already been written (Margie Bearss' Sherman's Forgotten Campaign: The

Meridian Expedition, OP-1987, Gateway Press), but Buckley Foster's new

book Sherman's Mississippi Campaign is the first modern attempt at an

in-depth analysis of the campaign. Foster marks the Meridian

expedition as a crucial milestone in the evolution of W.T. Sherman's

strategic thinking, a proving ground for the later Georgia and

Carolinas campaigns. For this campaign, Sherman completely abandoned

his supply lines and lines of communication. He stripped down his

complement of wheeled vehicles, taking along only a minimal number of

artillery pieces and supply wagons. The two infantry corps would

advance on parallel axes; which aided speed and provided as wide an

area as possible for the collection of food and forage. Any public

property (and large amounts of private property as well) that could

aid Confederate forces would be destroyed.

However, the one part of Foster's analysis that I am particular

skeptical of is his assertion that Sherman developed a workable policy

of allowing a wide latitude for destroying private property only in

towns and areas deemed important to the Confederate war effort. Beyond

finding no convincing evidence for it, I would object to this proposed

framework in terms of both practicality and effectiveness. I don't

believe the comparatively indisciplined citizen soldiers were

particularly concerned with such nuances. An idea that the high

command could turn the 'looting switch' on and off at their whim is

unrealistic. Additionally, with comparatively little attempt to

apprehend even serious looters/pillagers and no consistent application

of punishment, the lack of deterrence value seriously harms the

credibility of the direction from above. Then there is the question of

just what constitutes property essential to the enemy war effort.

While I quibble with Foster on this particular point, I commend his

attempt at creating a framework of understanding for such a difficult

and highly contradictory subject. In my mind, the great disconnect

between evolving "hard war" policy (as nicely outlined in Mark

Grimsley's Hard Hand of War) and actual enforcement is an area of

study that deserves much more attention.

Beyond analyzing the larger meaning and effectiveness of the Meridian

Campaign, the author (aided by a number of helpful maps) does provide

the reader with a clear and concise operational military history. The

blow by blow recitation of military events in Sherman's Mississippi

Campaign is not nearly as detailed as Bearss' earlier account, but

it's more than adequate and Foster does do a much better job than

Bearss did of integrating Sooy Smiths' cavalry column into his

account.

In the final estimation, Buckley Foster's Sherman's Mississippi

Campaign is an important contribution to the historiography of the

Civil War in the West and of the military career of William T.

Sherman. Students at all levels should find much to appreciate and

much to ponder.

[Acknowledgements: Thanks to Dennis Lloyd of University of Alabama

Press for his help and consideration]