Sunday, 17 February 2008

2007_04_01_archive



Health Care Reform Now

Dear Friends and Colleagues:

I hope that you have spent a relaxing Eastern and Passover Holiday.

Attached you find an interesting article from the Wall Street Journal

entitled "Perverse Incentives in Health Care."

The author claims that in health care delivery mediocrity is the rule

and excellence, where it exists, is distributed randomly. There is no

systematic reward for excellence and no penalty for mediocrity. As a

result, excellence tends to be the result of the energy and enthusiasm

of a few individuals, who usually receive no financial reward for

their efforts.

Due to the fixed price-system (i.e. third-party payors) high-quality,

low-cost care is not financially rewarding. Hospitals and doctors can

make more money providing inefficient, mediocre care(i.,e, volume

based care)

The author correctly states that in health care, contracts and prices

are imposed by large impersonal bureaucracies. The individual

physician has virtually no opportunity to offer a different bundle of

services for a different price. As a result, very little

entrepreneurship is possible.

Bottom line: When doctors and hospitals do not compete on the basis of

price, they do not compete at all.

Where third-party payment is the norm, markets tend to be bureaucratic

and stifling. But in those health-care sectors where third-party

payment is rare or nonexistent, the market is vibrant, entrepreneurial

and competitive.

I agree with the authors observation that many believe (including our

AMA) that health savings accounts (HSAs) will radically reform the

health-care system. Yet this is also a reform that focuses on demand,

not supply. Even with an HSA plan in hand as you approach the doctor's

office, you should know that your insurer has already spelled out what

services will be paid for, which ones will not and how much will be

paid. HSAs, therefore, will not free doctors to take advantage of

telephone, email, computerized records or any other truly innovative

service. Like school vouchers, HSAs create new freedom on the buyer

side without loosening the shackles on those who produce. The reform

is commendable. But real innovation must come from the supply side of

the market.

Why are our patients flogging to in-store clinics, traveling to

Thailand for surgery or are buying prescriptions from Canada? Because

they seek the best price for the care they need. Our health care

system is not market based, but controlled by bureaucrats and

legislators

Meanwhile, organized medicine is still battling every year to avoid

further Medicare cuts instead focusing on comprehensive health care

reform.

Our health care system is on life-support and we are still afraid to

pull the plug. If we don't do it someone will do it for us.

Lets jump-start the market-oriented process, promote entrepreneurship,

instead of stifling it.

Change has to happen NOW!!!

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Perverse Incentives in Health Care

By JOHN C. GOODMAN

Wall Street Journal April 5, 2007; Page A13

Our public-school system and our health-care system may seem as

different as night and day. Yet both systems share something in

common: Mediocrity is the rule and excellence, where it exists, is

distributed randomly.

In both cases the reason is the same. There is no systematic reward

for excellence and no penalty for mediocrity. As a result, excellence

tends to be the result of the energy and enthusiasm of a few

individuals, who usually receive no financial reward for their

efforts.

Research by John Wennberg and his colleagues at Dartmouth Medical

School suggest that if everyone in America went to the Mayo Clinic,

our annual health-care bill would be 25% lower (more than $500

billion!), and the average quality of care would improve. If everyone

got care at Intermountain Healthcare in Salt Lake City, our

health-care costs would be lowered by one-third.

Of course, not everyone can get treatment at Mayo or Intermountain.

But why are these examples of efficient, high-quality care not being

replicated all across the country? The answer is that high-quality,

low-cost care is not financially rewarding. Indeed, the opposite is

true. Hospitals and doctors can make more money providing inefficient,

mediocre care.

In a normal market, entrepreneurs in search of profit would solve this

problem by repackaging and repricing their services in order to make

customer-pleasing adjustments. Yet in health care, contracts and

prices are imposed by large impersonal bureaucracies. The individual

physician has virtually no opportunity to offer a different bundle of

services for a different price. As a result, very little

entrepreneurship is possible.

Sometime in the early 20th century, lawyers, accountants and most

other professionals discovered that the telephone was a useful

instrument for communicating with clients. Yet even today,

consultations with doctors by telephone are quite rare. Sometime in

the late 20th century most other professionals discovered email. Yet

only 21% of patients exchange email with their physicians; of these,

slightly more than 2% do so on a frequent basis.

One would be hard-pressed to find a lawyer in the U.S. today who does

not keep client records electronically. Ditto for accountants,

architects, engineers and virtually every other profession. Yet

although the computer is ubiquitous and studies show that electronic

medical record systems have the capacity to improve quality and

greatly reduce medical errors, no more than one in five physicians or

one in four hospitals have such systems.

Why has the practice of medicine (as opposed to the science of

medicine) changed so little in the modern era? The reason is because

of the way we pay for medical care, particularly the way we pay

doctors. At last count, there were about 7,500 specific tasks Medicare

pays for. Telephone consultations are not among them. Nor are email

consultations or electronic record keeping. What is true of Medicare

is also true of Blue Cross and most employer plans.

Things are made worse by the fact that patients do not usually pay for

health care with money; they typically pay with their time instead. As

in Canada and most other developed countries, health care in the U.S.

is mainly rationed by waiting, not by price.

When the doctor's time is rationed by waiting, the primary care

physician's practice is usually fully booked, unless the practice is

new or located in a rural area. As a result, there is very little

incentive to compete for patients the way other professionals compete

for clients. Because time -- not money -- is the currency we use to

pay for care, the physician does not benefit very much from

patient-pleasing improvements and is not harmed very much by an

increase in patient irritations. Bottom line: When doctors and

hospitals do not compete on the basis of price, they do not compete at

all.

Where third-party payment is the norm, markets tend to be bureaucratic

and stifling. But in those health-care sectors where third-party

payment is rare or nonexistent, the market is vibrant, entrepreneurial

and competitive.

Take cosmetic and Lasik surgery, for example. In both markets,

patients pay with their own money. They also have no trouble finding

what is virtually impossible to find for other types of surgery -- a

package price covering all aspects of the procedure. People can

compare prices, and in some cases quality. Providers are competing on

price and quality and competition pays off. Over the past decade and a

half, the number of cosmetic procedures grew sixfold along with

numerous technological innovations of the type that are blamed for

rising costs everywhere else in health care. Yet despite tremendous

growth and technological change, the real price of cosmetic surgery

declined. Over the past decade the real price of Lasik surgery fell by

30%.

The market for prescription drugs is another area where a great many

people are paying out of pocket. In response, Rx.com was the first

online outlet that began competing based on price and quality (they

make fewer mistakes than local pharmacies). Wal-Mart's new policy of

offering a month's supply of generic drugs is yet another example. Can

anybody imagine Wal-Mart offering the same deal to Blue Cross?

Perhaps the most spectacular instance of a health-care product

developing outside the third-party payment system is the walk-in

clinic. These can be found in shopping malls and drug stores in the

upper Midwest and they are spreading like wildfire around the country.

They post prices. There is very little waiting. They maintain records

electronically. The quality of service is comparable to traditional

primary care at half the cost.

I know what you're probably thinking. Markets may work for certain

specialized services; but can they work for run-of-the-mill hospital

surgery? Medical tourism is proving that the answer is yes. If you're

willing to leave the country you too can have access to efficient,

high-quality health care. In India, Thailand and elsewhere around the

world, facilities are offering U.S. citizens virtually every kind of

procedure for package prices, covering all the costs of treatment, and

sometimes airfare and lodging as well. These prices are often

one-fifth to one-third the cost in the U.S. and care is often

delivered in high-quality facilities that have electronic medical

records and meet American accreditation standards.

One part of our health-care system (the part where third parties are

absent) is teeming and bristling with entrepreneurship and innovation.

In the other part (where third parties pay the bills),

entrepreneurship has been all but extinguished. How can we make the

latter more like the former?

Public and private efforts to reform the health-care system have been

actively underway for the past two decades. The results have been

disappointing, to say the least, and they all have one thing in

common: They focus on the demand side of the medical marketplace.

Managed care, practice guidelines, pay-for-performance -- each of

these short-lived fads involves buyers of care telling the providers

how to practice medicine. Does no one notice how strange this is? In

normal markets, buyers do not instruct sellers on how to efficiently

produce their products. Even the HMO movement is a demand-side reform

in this context. The HMO doctor is just as trapped as the

fee-for-service physician and just as unable to rebundle and reprice

his services in innovative ways.

Some believe that health savings accounts (HSAs) will radically reform

the health-care system. Yet this is also a reform that focuses on

demand, not supply. Even with an HSA plan in hand as you approach the

doctor's office, you should know that your insurer has already spelled

out what services will be paid for, which ones will not and how much

will be paid. HSAs, therefore, will not free doctors to take advantage

of telephone, email, computerized records or any other truly

innovative service. Like school vouchers, HSAs create new freedom on

the buyer side without loosening the shackles on those who produce.

The reform is commendable. But real innovation must come from the

supply side of the market.

One would think that health insurers and employers would find it in

their self interest to break the mold. To the extent that

entrepreneurs raise quality and lower price, the insurance product

itself should become more attractive to potential customers. The

trouble is that the entire third-party payment system is completely

dominated by government (principally through Medicare and Medicaid).

Private insurers tend to pay the way the government pays and providers

who break Medicare rules in order to better serve the patient risk

being barred from the entire Medicare program.

A possible way out of this morass is to start with government. Under

the current system, Medicare and Medicaid stifle entrepreneurial

activity and financially punish efforts to lower costs or improve

quality. Why can't these agencies reward improvements instead? Suppose

an entrepreneur offered to replicate the Mayo Clinic in other parts of

the country -- potentially saving Medicare 25% of costs and improving

quality of care along the way. Medicare should be willing to pay, say,

12.5% more than its standard rates in order to achieve twice that

amount in lower total costs. That would leave the entrepreneur with a

12.5% profit -- an amount that one would hope would encourage other

entrepreneurs to enter the market with even better ideas.


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